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IN THE SUPRF.l\JIE COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BONNIE GALE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 7944 
FLOYD C. GALE, 
D·efenda,nt amd Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This i'S an app·eal from a Judgment enteTed Novem-
ber 21, 1952, modifying a pTeviously ·entered Decree in 
respect to support money payments by increasing the 
total which appellant was ordered to pay from $100.00 to 
$140.00 a month (R. p. 7). Under the original Decree of 
the court, appellant was ordered to pay the sum of $100.00 
a month for the support of his minor children at such 
time as he resumed employment or wa'S able to resume 
employment (R. p·. 7). For many years p:rior to the time 
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of the divorce, appellant had been employed as a bus 
driver with the Greyhound Lines, but for some time prior 
to the Divorce Decree appellant had been very ill and 
was undergoing treatm·ent at the State Hospital at Provo, 
Utah, (R. p. 22), although he was out of the hospital at 
the time of the divorce (R. p. 25). Prior to appellant's 
sicknes'S, he had been bringing home approximately 
$300.00 per month net pay from his job, and it was on 
this basis of his income that the Decre·e was made (R. p. 
2'3). In the first part of August of 1951, appellant re-
turned to work for the company and ever since that time 
has made the payments ordered under the Decree (R. p. 
31). On or about November 7, 1952, re'Spondent filed a 
Petition for Modification of Decree and the same was set 
for hearing by an Order to Show Cause on the 18th day of 
November, 1952 (R. p.ll). 
S'TATEME·NT OF POINTS 
UPON WHICH THE APPELLANT RELIE'S 
POINT I. 
R.ESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
THE COURT'S DECREE DOES NOT STATE OR ALLEGE 
ANY FACTS OR ANY SUFFICIENT GROUNDS UPON 
WHICH THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN SAID PETITION 
COULD BE GRANTED, AND APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS MADE AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING ON 
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND RENEWED AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY AT 
SAID HEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE TAKEN UPON THE HEARING OF 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE DOES 
NOT SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER OF COURT ENTERED IN SAID 
MATTER ON NOVEMBER 21, 1952. 
POINT III. 
NO MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR PERMANENT 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WAS SHOWN BY RE-
SPONDENT AT THE HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR 
MODIFICATION. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ORDER THE 
APPELLANT TO PAY INCREASED SUMS IN VIEW OF HIS 
ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN RELIANCE 
UPON THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF THE COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF 
THE COURT'S DECREE DOES NOT STATE OR ALLEGE 
ANY FACTS OR ANY SUFFICIENT GROUNDS UPON 
WHICH THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR IN SAID PETITION 
COULD BE GRANTED, AND APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS MADE AT THE OUTSET OF THE HEARING ON 
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND RENEWED AT THE 
CONCLUSION OF THE EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY AT 
SAID HEARING SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
The Petition for Modification of Decree (R. p. 8), 
filed in the court below by resp·ondent did not allege any 
facts whatsoever which would fairly app~raise the appel-
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lant of what facts respondent intended to rely on in the 
hearing on said Petition for an increase in support 
money.. The Petition alleged as a conclu'Sion that the 
appellant had "bettered his financial condition and is 
able to pay a more reasonable sum for the support of 
said minor children in accordance with present living 
costs; .that the requirements of the four children have 
. increased since the entry of said Divorce Decree". In 
no particular did 'Said Petition allege or set forth or state 
in any way that there had been a material or substantial 
and permanent change of conditions from those \rhich 
existed at the time of the entry of the original Decree. 
Nowhere were there any facts alleged to show in \rhnt 
way the circumstances or requirements of the said chil-
dren had increased or were different from what they were 
at the time of the entry of the Decree· and there were no 
facts alleged as a· basis of respondent's conclusion that the 
app~ellant had "bettered his financial condition". It has 
long been the law in this state that a petition for modifi-
cation of alimony or support awarded in a Divorce De-
cree must state facts sufficient to authorize its modifi-
cation, Chaffee vs. Chaffee, 63 U. 261, 225 P. 76. In 
Cody vs. Cody, 47 U. 456, 145 P. 952, at page 954 in the 
Pacific Reporte·r, in regard to the interpretation of the 
statute whereby the court derives its power to modify a 
Divorce Decree, the court uses the following language: 
"What was contemplated by the statute· was 
that where a court had granted a divorce decree 
and had allowed alimony, or had 1nade distribution 
of property and disposal of children, either party 
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could thereafter come· into court and allege that 
since the entry of the original decree material 
and permanent changes had taken place." 
It is apparent froni a reading of respondent's Petition 
for Modification that it does not state or allege facts or 
grounds upon which relief could be granted and appel-
lant's Motion to Dismiss (R. p. 13), made at the outset 
of the hearing and before any evidence was taken should 
have been granted. At the conclusion of the evidence of-
fered on the hearing of the Petition, appellant renewed 
his Motion to Dismiss (R. p·. 39), and the Motion should 
have been granted again at that time because it is obvious 
from a reading of the transcript of the evidence belov.T 
(R. pages 17- 42) that respondent did not even sustain 
the conclusions alleged in her Petition that the appellan.t 
had "bettered his financial condition", nor is there one 
single word of evidence in this record to show that the 
requirements of the four minor children have increased 
any or at all since the entry of the divorce decree as it was 
alleged in respondent's Petition for Modification (R. p. 
8). 
The appellant was forced into court to defend this 
Petition for Modification and increase without any in-
dication or idea as to what facts he would be required to 
meet. It is clearly the law in this jurisdiction as set forth 
in the Cody and Chaffee cases supra that a party should 
not be subjected to proceedings for the reopening and 
modification of prior divorce decrees except on pleadings 
which allege facts and grounds which show that there 
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has been a material or substantial and permanent change 
of the circumstances of either of the partie'S or both of 
them since the entry of the original decree. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE TAKEN UPON THE HEARING OF 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION TO MODIFY DECREE DOES 
NOT SUPPORT. THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER OF COURT ENTERED IN SAID 
MATTER ON NOVEMBER 21, 1952. 
'The Findings of Flact and Conclusions of Law (R. p. 
14), entered by the court below on November 21, 1952, in 
paragraph 2 of the Findings of Fact, recite that since 
the entry of said Divorce Decree the financial condition 
of the appellant has been bettered that he is now gain-
fully employed. This is the only finding of a factual na-
. ture what'Soever to support the court's order increasing 
support payments. There is no finding as to what the ap-
pellant's financial condition was at the time· of the divorce 
decree'; there is no finding in regard to the requirements 
of the minor children at the time of the decree or at the, 
time of the hearing on the Order To Show c·ause why 
the support payments should be increa'Sed; there is no 
finding that the appellant's financial condition has been 
bettered materially or substantially and permanently; 
as a matter of fact, the record is utterly devoid of any 
findings of fact which would lead to the conclusion that 
the moving party below, the respondent, had alleged 
and p·roved changed condition'S arising since the entry 
of the decree which require under the rules of equity and 
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justice a change in the decree, which test has been held 
to be the applicable test by which the court is to determine 
whether or not a decree will be modified in every single 
case in this court in which the question has been under 
consideration; a'S stated in Osrnus vs. Osmus, found at 
198 P. (2d) 233 on page 236 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"It is a principle now firmly established in 
this jurisdiction that to entitle either party to ·'1 
modification of a decree of alimony or support 
money, that such party plead and prove a change 
in circumstances such as to require, in fairne'Ss and 
equity, a change in the terms of the decree." 
and see also earlier Utah Cases therein cited. 
The appellant produced for the court below by Exhi-
bit I ~d Exhibit II a complete summary of every cent 
earned by appellant both gross and net. In Exhibit I for 
the 12-month period prior to his illne'Ss and the divorce, 
and by Exhibit II for the 15-nJonth period since the di-
vorce to the time of the hearing on the Petition for Modi-
fication. Exhibit I shows that for the 12-month period 
prior to the divorce appellant's net monthly income was 
$329.25. E·xhibit II shows that for the 15-month period 
since the divorce appellant's net monthly income aver-
aged $309.28. So that the evidence clearly shows that 
actually at the time of the hearing on the Petition for 
Modification appellant was making or had been making a 
net of $20.00 a month les'S than what he was earning at 
the time prior to the divorce and his illness. 
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Appellant is a bus driver for the Overland Grey-
hound Lines and has been for the past nine or nine and 
one-half years (R. p. 28). The drivers for that company 
are paid upon the ba'Sis of a certain rate per mile and 
at the time of the divorce appellant was receiving by 
reason of his length of service with the company, senior-
ity, etc., the sum of seven and one-fourth cents per n1ile 
driven, and at the time of the he·aring for modification 
he was still at this same rate of pay (R. p. 28). The 
drivers for that company, according to the length of time 
they have been there, may bid on the various runs or 
lines which runs or driving periods to various towns last 
for approximately three or four months before they are 
up for rebid (R. p. 28). The runs are different in tin1e 
and miles and therefore the income which a driver makes 
depends upon the particular run which he is able to secure 
every three or four month'S 'vhen the runs come up fot 
bid. These. various runs are bid on by the various drivers 
under a system of seniority at the company which 1neans 
that drivers according to the length of time they have 
been there may bid on the various lines (R. p. 28). Ap-
pellant's seniority allows him to be in such a bidding 
position in relation to the other drivers that he can securP. 
for himself the equivalent of a Salt Lake to Pocatello run 
which puts him in a position that he knows by virtue of 
his seniority status that he can secure a run during Paeh 
bidding period which will insure that he makes about a 
net of $300.00 per month (R. p. 29). At the time of the 
hearing on the Petition for Modification and for approxi-
mately three months prior thereto (R. p. 25) appellant 
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had been on the Salt Lake to Idaho Falls and return run 
which is the longest paying run on the division (R. p. 29) 
and which accounts for the fact that at the time of the 
hearing the appellant was actually receiving a higher 
income than at any time since or before the divorce, but 
it was only a temporary and not a permanent increase. 
Appellant got that higher paying run at the last bidding 
because no one with greater seniority hap·pened to bid 
and that run was contemplated for a rebid on the first 
of December, 1952, and appellant had no assurance that 
he would be able to bid on that higher paying run (R. p. 
29). So it can be seen that the monthly income of drivers 
for the Greyhound Lines will vary over the months during 
the year according to what run they are able to bid in on, 
but that there will be an average net income which a man 
is able to make because of his length of time with the com-
pany and it is submitted that at the time of the hearing 
for modification below that appellant's monthly net in- ' 
come was 'Still only $309.28 p·er month even including in 
the averaging to arrive at that'figure the 2 or 3 preceed-
ing months during which appellant had received his 
highest monthly income, so that the only possible way that 
a fair and accurate determination of what ap·pellant's 
. monthly income is, is to average it out in the way in which 
it was done in Exhibit I and Exhibit II, and it is apparent 
from these Exhibits and the other te'Stimony and evidence 
adduced at the hearing that there has been no· material 
or substantial and permanent "betterment of appellant'R 
financial condition", since the time of the original decree. 
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POINT III. 
NO MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL OR PERMANENT 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WAS SHOWN BY RE-
SPONDENT AT THE HEARING ON HER PETITION FOR 
MODIFICATION. 
That there must be a permanent as well as a material 
change in circumstances in order to entitle a party to a 
modification is amply supported by the ca'Ses of Chaffee 
vs. Chaffee, supra, and Carson vs. Carson, 87 U. 1, -17 P. 
(2d) 894. In the Carson vs. Carson case, supra, at page 
896 of the Pacific Reports, this court 'Said the following: 
"In a proper case the amount of alimony 
awarded in a decree of divorce may be changed, 
R. ·s .Utah, 1933, 40-3-5. (Now 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953). 
The party to a divorce, however, is not entitled tt) 
a modification of the decree of divorce in the ab-
sence of a showing that there has been a material 
and permanent change of conditions since the 
entry of the decree," and further cases cited there·· 
lll. 
There can be no question that the original decree· wa~ 
based on the premi'Se· that the appellant was earning an 
income of approximately $300.00 a month net. The fact 
was alleged to be so in paragraph 6 of the respondent's 
original complaint in the divorce action (R. p. 1), and the 
evidence at the hearing on the Petition to Modify clearly 
so indicates. Starting at page 22 of the Record the follow-
ing questions were· put to the respondent and the follow-
ing answers given by her: 
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Q. This decreed amount of support money at that 
time wa'S based on what you knew his income 
was on his job up until the time he got sick~ 
A. His sickness had a great effect on it too. 
Q. Up to that time he had been bringing home 
$300 net pay from his job~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. It was on that basis that the decree was made Y 
A. Yes. 
Q. A'Ssuming he had been able to go back to work 
and earn $300 again and pay you~ 
A. I asked this lawyer for three hundred to begin 
with. 
Q. I asked you whether or not it was based on the 
$300~ 
A. Yes. 
The fact that at the time the decree was actually 
entered the appellant was not 'vorking was considered and 
taken into account at that time by the court because the 
decree ordered the ap·pellant to pay nothing until he re-
turned or was able to return to work so surely it would 
be a mo'St specious argument to maintain the position 
that at the actual date of the signing of the decree the 
appellant was unemployed and at the time of the hearing 
on the Petition for Modification he was emp~loyed because 
an examination of the Complaint (R. p. 1) ·and Stipula-
tion for Property Settlement (R. p·. 4) and the Findings 
of F'act and Conclusions of Law (R. p. 5) and the Decree 
of Divorce (R. p·. 7) in the original action all show that 
it was recognized that the appellant was not at that time 
working and the entire Decree was based upon the as-
'SUmption that the appellant would pay the amount order-
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ed if and when he was able to return to work and the 
amount to be paid was based upon the assumption that 
appellant would he able to resume his employment and 
regain his approximate net income of $300.00 per 1nonth, 
which he had earned prior to the divorce and his sickness~ 
and this wa'S exactly the fact and exactly what happened. 
Appellant did return to work as contemplated in August, 
1951; he did regain his income as it was contemplated 
he would, and then he commenced the payments under 
the Decree as ordered by the court. 
In effect, what the court below in the original decree 
actually did was to take cognizance of the fact that the 
appellant was at that particular moment unemployed and 
decree that he pay nothing in view of that circun1stance 
and then provided that the decree should become opera-
tive upon the happening of a condition subsequent. 
POINT IV. 
IT WAS ERROR FOR THE COURT TO ORDER THE 
APPELLANT TO PAY INCREASED SUMS IN VIEW OF HIS 
ADDITIONAL OBLIGATIONS UNDERTAKEN IN RELIANCE 
UPON THE ORIGINAL DECREE OF THE COURT. 
Appellant's illness at and prior to the ti1ne of their. 
divorce was caused by the marital trouble existing he-
tween the parties. Appellant did not want the divorce. 
He made 1nany attempts to reconcile with the respondent 
for the benefit and welfare of his children and she refused 
him (R. P'· 30), and then in reliance upon the original De-
cree of the court appellant undertook the obligation of a 
new marriage (R. p. 31), and that at the tilne of the hear-
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ing below appellant and hi'S second wife were expecting a 
child (R. p. 32). Respondent never up until the time, of 
appellant's second marriage ever asked for or indicated 
to appellant that she needed any more money to support 
these children. It was only after she learned of appel-
lant's second marriage that she determined to institute 
the proceedings which resulted in the order from which 
the appellant appeals (R. p. 31). 
If the order of the lower court modifying the original 
Decree in this case is affirmed by this court in view of the 
facts and circumstances of this case, it would mean that 
in the future no man could rely upon a decree of court 
determining his obligations. It would mean that a man 
could never in good faith and without any attempt to 
evade his legal obligation'S for supporting his children as 
determined by the court attempt to seek some hap·piness 
and life for himself by virtue of a new attempt with a new 
partner at matrimonial happiness. If appellant's income 
or circumstances had materially and substantially 
changed for the better in thi'S case, of course, an entirely 
different situation would be presented and a man coul:l 
reasonably expect that if his position improved he could 
be called upon t~ increase the support payments, but the 
effect of an increase in a case of this type if permitted by 
this court could prove disa'Strous to all parties concerned, 
and would be most unfair to a man in the appellant's posi-
tion who attempted to plan for a new marriage in reliance 
upon the original Decree and without any intent what-
soever to evade his obligations as set forth by that De-
cree. 
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CONCLUSION 
It appears that what the court below really attempted 
to do in this case wa'S to rewrite the original Decree n1ore 
in conformity with what the court thought that the ori-
ginal Decree should have provided, and it is respectfully 
submitted that from the earliest cases in this jurisdiction 
that that is precisely what thi'S court has stated over and 
over again that the lower court may not do, and that there 
is nothing contained in this record which justifies under 
the law of this jurisdiction a modification of the original 
Decree in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR. 
411 Ut~h Oil Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
